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STRATÉGIES DE CROISSANCE ET POLITIQUES DE LUTTE CONTRE LA 
PAUVRETÉ : l’hypothèse de complémentarité institutionnelle 
Robert Boyer 
 
Résumé 
 
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, les politiques qui supposaient une séparabilité des stratégies de 
lutte contre la pauvreté et de la logique du régime de croissance ont montré leurs limites. De plus, elles 
étaient basées essentiellement sur l’activation de mécanismes de marché. Par contraste les recherches en 
économie institutionnelle soulignent que la résilience et la performance des économies dérivent de la 
cohérence d’un ensemble de mécanismes de coordination, qui sont plus complémentaires que substituts 
au marché. L’hypothèse de complémentarité institutionnelle s’avère précieuse pour analyser 
simultanément les politiques anti-pauvreté et la dynamisation des régimes de croissance. Les différentes 
formes de capitalisme sont l’expression de complémentarités différentes entre le type de compétition, les 
institutions du marché du travail, la couverture sociale et le système d’innovation. Très généralement, les 
économies en voie de développement ne peuvent imiter ces configurations mais les études de cas 
nationales menées par l’UNRISD font ressortir  des traits communs à la plupart des expériences réussies. 
Elles ont créé l’équivalent de cercles vertueux au sein desquels stimulation de la croissance et programme 
anti-pauvreté se confortent l’une l’autre. L’article propose deux méthodes pour détecter ces 
complémentarités : l’analyse qualitative comparative d’une part, les diagnostics des facteurs limitant la 
croissance de l’autre. Il importe aussi de prendre en compte la séquence des différentes mesures et le 
temps long du changement institutionnel. 
 
GROWTH STRATEGIES AND POVERTY REDUCTION:  the 
Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article starts from the limits of the policies that assume a significant de-connection between 
antipoverty strategies and the logic of the growth regime and that mainly rely upon market mechanisms. 
By contrast, a branch of the new institutional economics argues that a complete set of coordinating 
mechanisms is constitutive of really existing economies and that they are more complementary than 
substitute. The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis (ICH) may be useful for analyzing 
simultaneously the antipoverty policies and the viability of growth regimes. The different brands of 
capitalism are the outcome of complementary institutions concerning competition, labor market 
institutions, welfare and innovation systems. Generally, such configurations cannot be emulated by poor 
developing countries, but reviewing the preliminary findings of the UNRISD country case studies suggests 
some common features to all successful experiments. Basically, antipoverty policies are efficient when they 
create the equivalent of virtuous circles within which growth entitles antipoverty programs and conversely 
these programs sustain the speed and stability of growth. Two methods are proposed in order to detect 
possible complementarities and design accordingly economic policies: the Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) on one side, national growth diagnosis on the other side. A special attention is devoted to 
the timing of policies and the role of policy regimes. A brief conclusion wraps up the major findings and 
proposes a research agenda. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For many governments and most international organizations, the reduction of poverty is now 
a crucial objective for the current decade and even the millennium. But the major issue is then to 
design and implement the related policies. A brief retrospective analysis suggests that the 
previous policies have had mitigated outcomes and therefore they cannot be generalized to 
lagging countries.  
 
More precisely, the impact of internal and external liberalization has been reassessed. In some 
cases, the strengthening of market forces and price mechanisms has been quite helpful in reducing 
poverty, if not inequalities: it seems to be the case for China and other Asian countries. In other 
instances, the full liberalization of product, labor and financial markets has been quite detrimental 
to macroeconomic stability since the bursting out of major financial crises has exacerbated 
poverty creation in the very same countries that represented themselves as dominated by a large 
middle class: one recognizes the dramatic transformation of the Argentinean economy. 
 
Similarly, during the 90s, many economists and international institutions stated that a good 
macroeconomic policy and environment was a necessary and sufficient condition for a stable and fast 
growth and consequently for a large poverty reduction. This hypothesis has been falsified by the 
trajectory of most Latin American countries, where the implementation of the so-called 
Washington consensus has significantly pauperized a fraction of middle classes. Even for some 
Asian countries, the implementation of stabilization programs after the 1997 financial crises has 
aggravated poverty, far from reducing it. The Indonesian trajectory is quite illustrative of this 
unexpected outcome. 
 
Therefore since the early 2000s, experts and governments are searching for new strategies in 
order to promote what is called in most Latin American countries “growth with equity”. This 
aggiornamento has been associated with a clear perception that the motto “the same size for all” 
has failed therefore the challenge is to take more explicitly into account the specificities of each 
national economy. In order to address these two core issues, the present chapter is built upon a 
threefold hypothesis: 
 
• For any country with massive poverty, policies that target poverty as if it were marginal 
feature within prosperous economies are totally inadequate. It is much more relevant to 
explicit the interrelations between the contemporary structural transformations, emerging 
growth regimes, and their impact upon poverty and inequality. 
 
• A recent development in institutional analysis provides a tool in order to cope with this 
challenge. The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis (ICH) explains why not any single 
policy tool is able to reduce poverty: basically, several instruments have to be combined in 
order to generate a viable economic regime that reduces poverty. 
 
• Whereas the implicit reference to a pure market economy implies frequently the reference to 
a one best way and canonical institutional configuration, ICH points out that several 
configurations may trigger the emergence of a virtuous circle, within which growth and 
poverty reduction are closely associated. 
 
Building upon this analytical framework, This article is organized as follows. It is first 
important to survey briefly the nature of conventional antipoverty strategies and explicit the 
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reasons for rather unsatisfactory outcomes. A core argument of the present chapter is precisely 
that there is no single panacea for promoting a high growth with equity, since market 
mechanisms are far from being the only existing and efficient coordinating mechanisms (II). A 
second step of the analysis is devoted to the general presentation of the ICH that precisely builds 
upon the complementarity of various coordinating mechanisms as key factors in the viability and 
stability of a growth regime and simultaneously poverty reduction. The purpose of any 
institutional design should be to organize such a complementarity in order to propitiate the 
emergence of a virtuous circle: antipoverty policies enhance growth and conversely the dividends 
derived from growth allow their financing (III). Since the concept of ICH might be unfamiliar to 
the reader, it might be enlightening to show how this framework helps in understanding some 
major stylized facts for developed economies. Basically, combining two or more institutional 
forms, somehow imperfect with respect to a pure market arrangement, may nevertheless deliver 
quite satisfactory outcomes in terms of economic efficiency and social justice. Various examples 
of such configurations are provided concerning the social democratic institutional configuration 
or the variety of the institutional arrangements fitted for a knowledge-based economy (IV). 
Nevertheless, it is important to show that ICH can be applied to developing countries, delivering 
original results concerning the variety of configurations able to promote growth with equity. The 
purpose is not to mimic or extrapolate the developed world arrangements but to use the related 
methodology in order to diagnose what are the relevant complementarities in each national case 
study. Some examples extracted from the national studies of the UNRISD program are given as a 
first step in the full implementation of this methodology (V). Finally, any progress in the 
direction of a better understanding of contemporary issues calls for the implementation of some 
original methods that stick to the specificities of each case study, in space and historical time (VI). 
A conclusion sketches a research agenda, featuring close interactions between the basic concepts 
of ICH and the investigation of national case studies (VII).      
II.  UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY: THE FAILURE OF 
MONO-CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS 
The emergence of the sub-discipline of development economics took place when economists 
had to recognize that the theories they have been elaborating for mature industrialized countries 
do not fit with the main features of the rest of the world. Thus, the analyses of development have 
explored the impact upon growth of alternative hypotheses by contrast with those adopted by 
conventional growth theory. Basically, economic instability, poor growth performance and the 
persistence of poverty were interpreted as an evidence for the absence of a key single factor that 
has evolved continuously through time. Firstly, the scarcity of capital has been blamed and then 
the lack of entrepreneurship, thirdly the absence of competition, and finally a poor human capital 
formation have been attributed a key role in the absence of development. More recently the lack 
of transparency, economic freedom, and ultimately good macroeconomic governance, have been 
perceived as key factors inhibiting growth and poverty reduction (table 1). Since the 90s, the so-
called Washington consensus has diffused all over the world a basic vision: full liberalization, 
both internal and external, was the key strategy for promoting growth and eradicating poverty. In 
retrospect, the relevance of this strategy has to be reassessed. 
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Table 1 – Under-Development theories: a succession of mono causal interpretations? 
Contents/ 
Explanatory      
goals factors 
Self-
perpetuating 
growth 
Higher 
standards of 
living 
Technological 
and institutional 
modernization 
Human 
development (health 
education,…) 
Less 
poverty 
Empo-
werment 
Development 
as a form of 
freedom 
Ecological 
sustainability
Development of 
capital 
Neo-classical theory of growth 
SOLOW (1956; 1957) 
  
Entrepreneurship 
 Schumpeterian theory       
HAGEN (1962) 
An appropriate pricing 
system 
         Theory of
equilibrium 
SCHULTZ (1964) 
The opening up of an 
economy 
Open economy model 
KRUEGER (1979) 
     
Human capital  Theory of endogenous growth 
LUCAS (1988; 1993) 
    
The basic institutions 
of capitalism 
 The new institutionalism 
NORTH (1981; 1990) 
     
Good governance      World Bank
(1993-2001) 
Absence of corruption   State and corruption 
MAURO (1995) 
     
Democracy      Democracy and Growth 
BARRO (1996) 
Promotion of rights 
and freedom 
    Development as a form of freedom 
SEN (2000) 
 
 
Environment 
         Ecological model
MEADOWS (1972); 
CHAKRAVORTY (1997)
 4
II.1. The conventional orthodoxy and its limits 
Basically, the so-called Washington consensus was built upon five main pillars. This 
framework was perceived as rather coherent and relevant, but the last decade has largely 
mitigated this statement. 
  
• The first pillar assumed that pure market mechanisms imply the convergence towards full 
employment, and that it is the best strategy in order to alleviate the sources of poverty linked 
to underemployment and unemployment. De facto, no careful analytical studies substantiates 
this belief about the positive role of liberalization on poverty reduction (Reddy 2007). One 
can find striking counter examples. On one side, back to the 90s, the Argentinean 
government was among the very best followers of the strategy of full liberalization both 
internal and external: this has not prevented the pauperization of a large fraction of the 
population and finally the financial collapse of the country. On the other side, continental 
China has liberalized most product markets, but not removed strong public interventions in 
the economy: the poverty rate has drastically declined but the inequalities have been 
widening.   
 
• Another basic assumption was that any welfare policy or institutionalization of workers/citizens rights 
was bounded to push the economy out of its “natural equilibrium”. Consequently, any 
measure explicitly devoted to the reduction of poverty, may end up into the opposite, i.e. and 
extension of poverty. Such an unintended outcome has actually been observed, but this does 
not mean that whatever adequate pro-poor policy is bound to fail. Remember that the 
celebrated social democratic model of Sweden came out of a very turbulent period 
characterized by rural poverty and large emigration out of the country. Various cases studies 
of UNRISD program suggest that some social transfers can simultaneously benefit to poor 
people and stimulate growth as experienced in South Africa (Seekings 2007) and in Botswana 
(Selolwane et al. 2007).  
 
• Conventional approaches rely heavily upon a rather specific method, benchmarking. It assumes 
that it is easy to attribute the success of a strategy to a single device. Consequently 
governments should try to implement it into their economy in order to improve past poor 
performance. This approach suffers from a basic weakness: the quite impressionistic 
diagnosis of the unique factor at the origin of a successful strategy. Most of these diagnoses 
have proven to be false concerning the secrets of the German social market economy in the 
70s, the Japanese model in the 80s, and then the Silicon Valley dynamism in the 90s. 
Basically, a series of economic institutions contribute to the viability and success of a growth 
regime, and it is not so easy to try to directly import such a complex nexus of social 
compromises and coordinating mechanisms. It is crucial to understand a specific 
configuration and its internal dynamics, as a precondition for designing a pro-growth and 
pro-poor policy. 
 
• A derived conclusion was precisely that lagging countries should try to import the complete 
institutional setting of the most successful country during the present period. Actually this 
assumes that there is a single one best configuration, with possibly strong complementarities, for 
example between market-competition and democratic principles. The recent literature on the 
diversity of capitalisms (Hall and Soskice 2001) and the previous comparative analysis 
inspired by régulation theory (Boyer 1996; Amable 2003) challenge this uniqueness and explain 
that various complementarities and political alliances justify a significant variety of 
 
 5
institutional configurations. This opens some opportunities for developing countries that are 
not bound to emulate the best strategy observed in the developed world. 
 
• Another pillar of the Washington consensus stated that a sound macroeconomic policy is the 
necessary and sufficient ingredient in order to promote full employment and rapid growth. 
Of course, unwise public policies extending debt and generating high and unstable inflation 
have proven to be quite detrimental to growth and poverty reduction: most Latin-American 
countries during the 70s and 80s followed such a trajectory. Nevertheless, the return to a 
more orthodox macroeconomic policy in the 90s has not been sufficient for a complete 
reversal of previous negative trends: slow and unstable growth, rising inequalities, large 
unemployment and surge of informal labor have persisted (IADB 1995; 1996). Therefore, 
experts and governments have to design other policies directed towards innovation, institutional 
reform and growth and this might be especially important for poverty reduction.    
II.2. The institutional analyses and their responses 
At the opposite of the ideal of a pure market economy, recent advances in institutional 
economics enlarge the scope of analysis and provide a more balanced view about the coherence 
and viability of market economies. For development theories, this means the adoption of a 
systemic and institutionalist approach that could be summarized by the following motto: getting the 
institutions right according to the legacy of past economic specialization, social traditions and 
present political choices (Boyer 2006d). This helps in correcting the limits of previous 
conceptions of development.  
 
• Any really existing economy display a significant variety of coordinating mechanisms, much more 
diverse than the conventional opposition between Market and State. If the first mechanism 
relies upon interest and horizontal interactions among actors, at the opposite, the second is 
built upon obligation and an asymmetric exercise of power. Therefore, if one takes into 
account both the motive of action (either interest or obligation) and the distribution of power 
among actors (either symmetric or typically hierarchical) four other coordinating mechanisms 
emerge: the private hierarchy of organizations and firms, the community, the association, and 
finally network. Hence societies and economies exhibit a multiplicity of institutional 
arrangements, more or less imperfect, that have to be compared one with another and not 
with a mythical pure market economy (figure 1). 
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Figure 1 – A synopsis of different modes of coordination and institutional arrangements 
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• Recent research on development has stressed the possible role of social capital in the 
functioning of contemporary developed economies (Putnam 2000), but also in the process of 
economic development (Narayan 1999). Actually this term tries to capture the role of 
personal and collective networks concerning the flow of information, economic exchanges 
and the provision of a modicum of security to individuals. But there is another meaning that 
originates from the research on welfare States: by providing some basic collective goods 
related to health, education and security, the corresponding expenditures should be classified 
as investment, since they contribute to social capital formation. Its volume and composition 
are therefore factors of production and contributors to growth. This new framework was first 
proposed by Dutch scholars (Visser and Hemerijck 1997) and more recently by social 
scientists from Scandinavian countries (Esping-Andersen 1990; 2003). In a sense, the theory 
of capability by Amartya Sen (2000) is recognizing that some welfare enhancing supply of 
public goods may benefit simultaneously to poverty reduction and stimulation of growth. 
Within these new analytical frameworks, some welfare policies aiming at the development of 
workers and citizens securities may have favorable productive impact and positively affect the 
dynamic efficiency of the economic regime. For instance, income security may imply high 
wages but simultaneously higher productivity and easier acceptance of innovation and 
structural change: short run extra costs can be associated to a larger dynamic efficiency. 
Similarly, work life security may imply some constraints detrimental to short run performance 
of firms but it is an incentive to more innovations and higher growth. It is specially so for 
health, education and training expenditures. The same reasoning can be applied to skill 
security or voice and representation security. Therefore the search for social justice is not 
necessarily detrimental to growth performances, i.e. a strategy that makes compatible poverty 
reduction and growth (figure 2). 
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Figure 2 – How some social policies may enhance dynamic efficiency 
 
       Short-run negative
impact on 
employment 
 Productivity 
hike 
Ambiguous short-
run impact upon 
employment 
 
 
 
CONCERN 
 FOR SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 
         
 
 
+
 
   INCOME  
SECURITY 
 Incentive to labor- 
saving innovation 
Medium-term higher-
productivity increases 
-
  
Innovation and 
technical change 
 
    
 
 
 +      
           
        
  V
Higher wage More demand + 
  
 
 
OICE- 
REPRESENTATION 
SECURITY 
 Voice allows better 
organization 
 Better economic 
reactivity of firms 
 Higher potential 
growth 
 
      
 
 
 +  
 
HIGHER 
DYNAMIC 
EFFICIENCY 
DECENT 
WORK 
      
      
WORK AND LIFE 
SECURITY 
Healthier population
and workers 
Higher participation
rate, less absenteeism 
 + +   
 
 + Labor supply  
       
SKILL 
 SECURITY 
More competent 
workforce 
Ability to cope with 
innovation 
 
 
+ 
   
          
       
           
s   p     
 
 
 
LABOR-MARKET 
SECURITY 
More risk 
acceptance 
-   
 
 
    Moral-hazard problem Unemployment tra
 8
• Isolated best practices cannot be simply imported at the level of national institutional building, since 
they have to be combined existing institutions and organize complementarities among new 
and old institutions. In some cases, a quite efficient institution in one country may prove to 
be detrimental to economic performance when transplanted to another country, with 
distinctive productive organization, social values and political intermediation. For instance, 
during the 90s, many analysts of the new economy thought that the scarcity of venture 
capitalist was the main constraint limiting European growth. In retrospect, it is quite clear 
that once that limitation has been removed, most European economies still have been 
lagging, by lack of the complementary institutions observed in the Silicon Valley, i.e. a new 
pattern for intellectual property rights, close relations between university and business, as well 
as a very active local labor market for highly qualified individuals (Boyer 2004b). Conversely, 
the absence of typical venture capital, American style, does not seem to have prevented some 
Scandinavian countries to be quite successful in implementing a knowledge based economy, 
i.e. the underlying paradigm to the late new economy.  
 
• This last remark points out a quite general teaching of contemporary institutional research: 
given the same productive paradigm and configuration for the world economy, there exist 
several successful configurations that display different complementarities among basic economic 
institutional forms. This result has been observed during the Golden Age when at least four 
brands of capitalisms coexisted and developed complementary specializations (Boyer 2004b, 
Amable et al. 1997). This plurality of institutional architectures persist in the present era of 
technological paradigm shift and globalization: the knowledge economy and the related 
growth regime are compatible with quite contrasted complementarities.  
In the social democratic case, a comparative institutional analysis shows that a good and quite 
diffuse general education, life long learning and a large investment by firms in knowledge are 
the precondition for the ability to master information and communication technologies and 
nurture innovations that provide the competitiveness of the national economy (figure 3). 
Figure 3 – The social democratic configuration 
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INSTITUTIONS 
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But this is not at all the unique configuration: a knowledge based economy can be the 
outcome of a large deregulation of quite all markets and the diffusion of science pushed 
innovations. In this context, the defense of intellectual property rights and incidentally 
sophisticated financial innovations and markets are crucial components of this configuration, 
typical of the American way to a knowledge based economy (figure 4).  
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Figure 4 – The deregulated, Science pushed configuration 
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The empirical analysis (Boyer 2004c) reveals a third configuration, probably the most 
interesting for contemporary developing economies. Actually, until the 70s, some lagging 
countries such as Ireland were constrained in their development by the existing international 
relations and their inability to forge the social and economic organizations relevant for their 
insertion into the Fordist productive paradigm. With the changing pattern in their relations 
with the world economy and the emergence of a productive paradigm based upon 
information and communication technologies, some of these countries have been successful 
in designing and implementing the institutional forms required by this new context. 
Consequently, the club of industrialized countries that was supposed to be definitely closed 
for outsiders, is now open for many South Asian countries, India, China, and not only Ireland 
(figure 5). 
Figure 5 – Leap frogging for lagging countries 
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• A last rebuttal of the conventional vision about growth and poverty is derived from the 
advances in macroeconomic theory. Basically the core assumption that long term growth is the 
mere outcome of a series of shift in the short run macroeconomic equilibrium of an economy has 
been falsified by the analysis of the two last decades. Clearly, growth is a matter of surplus 
creation and its productive reallocation, in conformity with the old classical vision. When the 
degree of sophistication of the economy increases, it is not sufficient to invest a large volume 
of saving, since it becomes necessary to innovate in order to permanently renew the 
competitive advantage. Beneath this general approach, the factors constraining this process 
appear to be quite specific to each group of countries. Therefore, traditional comparative 
analysis and cross section econometric studies have to be replaced by a precise investigation 
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of the characteristics of a national trajectory in order to detect the hierarchy of the factors that 
are limiting growth and possibly poverty reduction (Hausmann et al. 2005).  
III.  THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY HYPOTHESIS IN A 
NUTSHELL 
This approach belongs to the theoretical aggiornamento just described by the previous 
section. One of its merits is to overcome the conventional opposition between Markets and 
States as exclusive and antagonistic coordination mechanisms and it gives the basis for a better 
understanding of the complexity of the link between national institutional architectures and 
performances in terms of economic efficiency and social justice. 
 
Within the quite dynamic field of the economics of the institutions, the Institutional 
Complementarity Hypothesis (ICH) has proposed a new research agenda in order to understand 
simultaneously the issue of the diversity of capitalism and  how to design viable strategies for 
reforming the institutions inherited from the Second World War (Hall and Soskice 2003; Aoki 
2001; Amable 2003). This framework has successfully been tested for developed and 
industrialized countries but one finds few references in the domain of development theory. The 
purpose of this short paper is to initiate such a research program. 
III.1. No single coordinating mechanism can warrant the viability and 
efficiency of a national economy  
This is at the core of institutional analysis. 
 
 On one side, any single institutional arrangement (IR) – a market is one of them – requires a 
precise organization, rules and norms, means of individual and collective compliance and these 
requirements have to be manufactured by the mobilization of resources outside this institutional 
arrangement. Under this respect the pure market competition is among the most demanding 
institutional arrangements and not at all a state of nature that would result from a spontaneous 
evolution. This is the converging conclusion of the microeconomic theory of asymmetric 
information, the findings of economic history about the emergence of markets and the evaluation 
of the fate of deregulation in OECD countries. The quite difficult and painful transformation of 
former socialist economies is quite illustrative of the fact that a market economy is a complex 
social and political construction (table 2). 
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Table 2 – Coordinating mechanisms: their governance and prerequisite 
GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
RULES OF EXCHANGE INDIVIDUAL MEANS 
OF COMPLIANCE 
COLLECTIVE MEANS 
OF COMPLIANCE 
Free entry and exit Voluntary spot 
exchange 
Legal enforcement of 
control 
Norm of private 
property 
MARKETS 
Bilateral exchange or 
market place (Wall 
Street) 
 Regulations to 
maintain a public 
market 
Legitimacy of free 
market 
Informal membership 
evolves over long 
period of time 
Voluntary exchange 
based on social 
solidarity and high 
degree of trust 
Social norms and 
moral principles 
impose obligations 
Highly 
institutionalized 
norms and rules 
require members to 
accept "corporate" 
obligations 
COMMUNITIES 
  Knowledge of others 
and reciprocity over 
time 
 
Semiformal 
membership 
Voluntary exchange 
over a time period 
Contractual bonds Personal relations NETWORKS 
Bilateral or 
multilateral exchange 
 Resource dependence Trust built outside the 
economic arena 
Formal membership Restricted to members Self-interest Some degree of 
compulsion 
ASSOCIATIONS 
Multilateral exchange Opposition insider/ 
outsider 
Reputation effect Partially private 
administration 
Complex 
organizations which 
tend to become 
bureaucratic 
Restricted to 
members, exchange 
based on asymmetric 
power, bureaucratic 
rules 
Rewards to individuals Highly 
institutionalized rules 
PRIVATE 
HIERARCHIES 
  Asymmetric power, 
threat of sanctions 
Members socialized 
into corporate culture, 
use of sanctions 
Public hierarchy Unilateral action Exit (tax evasion, 
migration) 
Coercion STATE 
De jure and imposed 
membership 
Indirect and global 
political and economic 
exchange 
Voice (vote, lobbying) Social rules or norms 
 
On the other side, each institutional arrangement has a limited domain of applicability and 
cannot be extended to the entire economy. Some IR are adapted to allocate efficiently typical 
goods, some others are building the trust necessary to the coordination of complex productive 
chains, still others are devoted to the supply of public goods. Furthermore, equity concerns are 
not taken into account by the same IR that aim at the efficiency of allocation of resources. For 
instance, the market cannot deal with the determination of the supply of public goods, with 
externalities and with social justice concern. States have no clear superiority to allocate 
conventional goods but they are quite adapted to the coordination of strategic externalities and 
the delivery of public goods (table 3). 
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Table 3 – Each coordinating mechanisms has is own specific strengths and failures 
COORDINATING MECHANIMS 
TYPE OF  
FAILURE MARKET COMMUNITIES NETWORKS ASSOCIATIONS 
PRIVATE 
HIERARCHIES STATE 
Needs an 
internal 
enforcement 
authority 
Needs trust and 
loyalty, often 
coming from 
outside (family, 
religion, 
ethnicity) 
Need an external 
enforcement authority 
Usually relies on 
the state as an 
enforcer 
Might enhance 
opportunistic 
behavior 
Needs controls 
external to state 
bureaucracy 
(judges, parliament, 
market) to correct 
state abuses 
ENFORCEMENT 
Facilitates 
collusion and 
imperfect 
competition 
Compatible 
with various 
types of 
competition  
 
May facilitate 
cartelization and 
monopoly 
Resembles 
enforcement 
mechanism of 
carrels  
 
The ideal of 
internal markets 
might hurt 
incumbent 
workers 
Lobbies can 
capture public 
interest goals 
Cannot 
provide 
collective 
goods or 
deal with 
externalities 
Can internalize 
some collective 
goods (quality, 
training) but not 
others (welfare, 
general public 
goods) 
Useful for enhancing 
quality and training 
but not very good in 
providing for societal 
general welfare 
Useful for 
establishing 
standards and 
quality, for 
setting rules of 
competition in 
the industry 
Governance 
costs might 
exceed the 
benefits of 
internal division 
of labor 
Can provide public 
goods but has 
difficulties in 
providing them in 
precise amounts 
PUBLIC GOOD 
AND 
EXTERNALITY 
Inadequate 
monitoring 
of technical 
change and 
innovation 
Members tightly 
integrated into 
community, 
have limited 
capacity for 
innovations 
Weak in the provision 
of collective goods  
 
Useful for 
providing many 
goods 
collectively that 
individual 
members cannot 
provide for 
themselves 
Slow to react to 
changes in the 
environment 
Might fail in 
inducing technical 
change 
EFFICIENCY Some basic 
social 
relations 
cannot be 
provided by 
pure market 
mechanisms 
Some goods 
cannot be 
delivered at 
sufficiently low 
costs 
Slow to enhance 
efficiency and speed 
of adaptation, except 
in industries where 
technology is complex 
and rapidly changing 
Facilitates 
cooperation and 
X-efficiency but 
not allocation 
efficiency  
 
Deficient in 
cooperation and 
X-efficiency 
Can be highly 
bureaucratic and 
cannot easily 
deliver goods at 
low cost 
EQUITY Facilitates 
inequality in 
income and 
wealth 
Might lead to 
retarded 
development 
When widely 
developed into 
industrial districts, 
networks may 
facilitate greater 
equality and income 
distribution. When 
weakly developed, 
networks tend to 
increase societal 
inequality 
Narrow 
encompassing 
associational 
structures lead 
to income 
inequality 
Excessive 
multiplication of 
controllers 
(frustration and 
inequality) 
Might enhance 
inequality (power 
and privilege)  
 
III.2. The various coordinating mechanisms are more complementary than 
substitute  
The previous results have an important implication: the imperfections of one mechanism are 
to be corrected by another one, that itself calls for a third and different coordinating mechanism. 
The example of financial markets is enlightening: what is generally conceived as a pure market do 
suppose an organization of the transactions under the aegis of an association or a firm, 
themselves under the supervision of a public agency in charge of preserving the transparency and 
fairness of transactions. This agency can be captured by lobbies and this may call for direct State 
intervention. This complex mix displays different configuration across countries and is under 
permanent threat to be eroded by the generalization of opportunistic behavior. Consequently, the 
hegemony of a single IR is quite unlikely and generally successful configurations organize a de 
facto complementary between a whole spectrum of IR (figure 6). 
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Figure 6 – Combining various and complementary institutional arrangements in order to get a 
viable configuration  
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III.3. A definition of complementarity and related concepts 
Actually, there is a risk of confusion of complementarity with seemingly similar but distinct 
concepts. The emergence of this term has been associated with some implicit hypotheses that 
have to be spelled out. 
III.3.1 Supermodularity   
Two elements E and E’ are said to be supermodular if the performance R of the conjunction 
of E and E’ is superior to any other mix of elements i.e.  
 
R(E,E’) > R(E,A) ∀ A ≠ E’  and  R(E,E’) > R(B,E’)  ∀ B ≠ E 
   
This precise definition put strong limits to the use of the notion of supermodularity. First the 
analyst has to explicit a criteria of performance that is not so evident (profit maximization for the 
firm, but what for capitalist economies as a whole: average profit rate , rate of growth, total factor 
productivity, level of employment and activity, equalitarian distribution of incomes, wealth,…). 
Second, the concept is clearly associated with the idea of optimum and maximization, a core 
trend of economic analysis but it is not necessarily so for sociology, law, history and so on. 
Basically, only sophisticated models (see for instance Amable et al. 2001) are able to prove such a 
supermodularity. But how can we diagnose supermodularity? It cannot be done by direct 
observation, since it requires the construction of a formal model engendering a series of fictitious 
worlds. 
 
 A good example of possible supermodularity relates to productive models. It has been argued 
that just in time, total quality control and high skill workers define a genuine productive model at 
odds with the previous Fordist model whereby mass-production of standardized good required 
less competence from the workers and less demanding consumers in terms of quality. The very 
concept of supermodularity has precisely been used in order to show that a continuous and piece 
mal adjustment of managerial tools was not able to promote the transition from the old to the 
new productive model (Milgrom and Roberts 1990).  
III.3.2 Complementarity 
Two elements E and E’ are said to be complementary if the performance R of the conjunction 
of E and E’ is superior to the performance of each element considered separately, i.e.  
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R(E,E’) > R(E) and  R(E,E’) > R(E’)   
   
The concept of complementarity is less demanding that supermodularity, since it only requires 
that the conjunction of two elements is Pareto improving with respect to the existence of only 
one of the two entities. Nevertheless, both complementarity and supermodularity require the 
choice of a performance criteria R and the ability to compare various systems in order to check 
the basic property. Either by using formal models or by observing a hierarchy in the ranking of 
systems composed respectively of only E, only E’ or both  E and E’.  
 
Some examples of possible complementarity might be useful to grasp the nature of this 
concept. According to many authors, a financial regime governed by direct finance is 
complementary with weak unions and the domination of short-term strategies and conversely, a 
patient financial regime built upon banks credit is complementary to a strong union, both 
involved into long-term strategies. Another example associates as complementary an 
accommodating monetary policy and flexible labor markets, a typical American configuration, 
whereas the monetary regime associated to a conservative central banker is seen as 
complementary to rigid labor markets that are supposed to explain European unemployment. 
III.3.3 Compatibility 
This third notion is frequently confused with the second one…but it should not! Actually E 
and E’ are compatible if they can be jointly observed in existing economies and societies, i.e. 
 
There exists an economy such that:  E ∩ E’ ≠ ∅ 
 
An interesting example is provided by Martin Höpner (2003) when he investigates the links 
between the dual management board system and employees’ codetermination. The tenants of a 
strong variant of VOC would call these institutions as complementary – having observed the good 
“performance” of the German economy until the early 90s – whereas the observation only says 
that they are compatible. The proof of complementarity would call for a theoretical model adding 
up and/or subtracting a complete series of institutions and assessing the related impact upon an 
agreed measure of performance. 
IV.  DEVELOPED ECONOMIES: A SUGGESTIVE INTERPRETATION OF 
MAIN STYLIZED FACTS 
Frequently, institutions are conceived as pure constraints that are detrimental to economic 
efficiency because they block the free adjustments of preferences and production constraints via 
price formation. For Douglass North (1990) they are also enablers for the strategy of individuals, 
in dealing with uncertainty, coordination and interpretation of information. Thus, contrary to 
Chicago school’s conceptions, some mix of institutions may deliver better economic and/or 
social outcomes that a pure market economy. This conception considers that some constraints 
restricting economic opportunism, short-termism or allow the supply of some public goods, are 
quite essential to the competitiveness of firms and thus they may have beneficial impact on 
economic and social outcomes (Streeck 1997).  
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IV.1. The origin of a paradox 
In the Walrasian tradition, the equilibrium prices make compatible preferences and 
technological constraints. This feature can be captured by the following equation that expresses 
that excess demand for each product and factor market is equal to zero. 
 
Z       =        f  (p,             P,            T     )                   0             [ pw      Cw,            Nw  ] 
Equilibrium 
price 
Consump
tion 
Employment 
 
Net excess 
demand 
Price Preferences Technology 
 
Walrasian 
equilibrium 
 
Unfortunately, the Walrasian auctioneer i.e. the global market maker, does not exist and has to 
be replaced by a series of institutions: a monetary regime (I1), a competition law, labor market 
institutions (I2). Therefore, individuals now not only react to the price signals but also according 
to the existing institutions that shape the formation of prices. A priori this institution rich 
economy displays a different equilibrium 
 
         Z       =        g     (p,     I1 ,         I2   )      =     0           [ pi      Ci,            Ni  ] 
 
Net excess 
demand 
    
price 
   
Institutions 
 Equilibr
ium 
price 
Consum
ption 
Employment Institutional  
equilibrium 
       
For most economists, the name of the game is to compare the outcome of a totally abstract 
economy, the Walrasian one, for which any market equilibrium is Pareto optimum, with a more 
realistic economy with various institutions but still an auctioneer. It is easy to understand then 
that any institution can only deteriorate the fit between preferences and technological 
possibilities. But if really existing decentralized imperfect markets are introduced, the various 
institutions might help in reaching a satisfactory equilibrium. Ideally, the various institutional 
settings should be compared according to their economic and social outcomes. But this requires 
the equivalent of a social welfare function in order to derive a single index out of the distribution 
of economic outcomes among individuals. Concerning the issue of complementarity, this very 
simple formalization might help in understanding the difference between compatibility and 
complementarity. 
 
Compatibility among institutions is observed when there exists a set of equilibrium prices, 
consumption and employment. Such a property is not necessarily fulfilled and thus this is a 
discriminating criteria in the assessment of the viability of alternative institutional architectures. 
 
I1 and I2   are compatible if there exists an equilibrium  E(I1 , I2)   ≠ ∅ 
 
Complementarity is a much more demanding criteria. First, the analyst has to compute an 
equilibrium with only the first institution I1 i.e. E(I1) and repeat the same operation for institution 
I2. Second, one adds the second institution and has to compute the new equilibrium E (I1, I2). 
Third and it is still more difficult, the economist has to adopt a welfare function in order to 
compare the two equilibria. Finally, the institutions I1 and I2 will be said complementary if their 
joint presence delivers a better outcome than each of the separate institutions. It can be captured 
by the two following conditions: 
 
I1 and I2   are complementary if   E(I1 , I2)   f  E(I1)       and            E(I1 , I2)   f  E(I2) 
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IV.2. Four examples 
If one stick to general equilibrium theory, one could introduce two discrepancies with respect to 
the conditions that deliver an equilibrium. First increasing returns to scale (H1), second imperfect 
competition or more precisely oligopolistic pricing (H2) have positive influence upon the 
existence of an equilibrium. Whereas a pure competitive (H0) equilibrium does not exist with 
(H1), the existence of imperfect competition entitles the existence of an equilibrium i.e.  
   
 E(H1 , H2)   f  E(H1, H0)    
 
Recent research about institutional complementarity (Amable et al. 2002) shows by formal 
modeling that strong unions (SU) and patient capital (PC) provided by bank credit may deliver 
better macroeconomic outcomes than competitive labor (CL) markets and short-termism (ST) 
capital markets, i.e.  
 
E(SU, PC)  f  E(CL, PC)    and     E(SU, PC)  f  E(SU, ST) 
 
Similarly, theoretical and empirical investigations exhibit a rather surprising complementarity 
(Amable 2003; 2004). Traditionally, economists consider that product market deregulation 
(PMD) and labor market flexibility (LMF) strategies are to be undertaken simultaneously, because 
they complement one with another. But empirical analysis shows that a second configuration is 
built upon the complementarity between product market regulation (PMR) and a significant 
institutionalization of labor mobility (ILM). By contrast, the intermediate configurations 
(deregulation of one market, but strong regulation of the other one) display less satisfactory 
outcomes in terms of growth and employment.  
 
E(PMD, LMF)  ≈  E(PMR, ILM) and E(PMD, ILM)  p  E(PMD, LMF) ; E(PMR, LMF) p 
E(PMR, ILM) 
 
 The viability of a banking system is threatened by periodic bank runs especially when free 
banking (FB) and fierce competition (FC) prevail. This has triggered the efforts of economists in 
order to find out regulations that could prevent such dramatic episodes. After nearly two 
centuries of recurring banking crises, practitioners and analysts finally find out the 
complementarity of two corrective devices. On one side a deposit insurance (DI) reduces the 
probability of bank runs but it simultaneously might induce banks to take more risk for their 
credit activities. Thus, on the other side, prudential ratios (PR) have been imposed in proportion 
to the risk taken for each category of credit (Borio 2003). We find again that this institutional 
equilibrium is better that the constraint- free equilibrium: 
 
E(DI, PR)  f  E(DI, FB)    and     E(DI, PR)  f  E(FC, PR) 
 
This leads to two general proposals expressing the same idea. First, two imperfections might be 
better than a single one, since they correct each other potential unbalances. Second, two constraints 
might be beneficial to the quality of economic equilibrium and social outcomes, provided they 
adequately interact each with another. 
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IV.3. From dyadic to triadic complementarity: towards an understanding of 
complex institutional architectures 
The analysis can be pushed one step forward since the ICH extended to more than two 
institutions. Actually, when social scientists diagnose the existence of socio-economic models, 
they mobilize a complex web of institutions, organizations and markets. 
  
• The now well known flexicurity model is based upon the synergy of three components (Boyer 
2006a). Quite permissive labor laws concerning the hiring and firing of workers generate 
intense flows on the labor market. Such a permanent flux is accepted by workers under the 
condition of quite generous unemployment benefits. In order to counteract the possible 
adverse effects of this generosity upon the duration of unemployment, the system had to be 
completed by an active employment policy, based on a sophisticated mix of control of the 
unemployed and upgrading of their competencies (figure 7). 
Figure 7 – The flexicurity configuration 
Labor laws   
 
 
  
  Employment 
policy 
 
 
 Denmark 
Welfare     
 
• The Danish flexicurity is itself embedded into a social democratic model, typical of Scandinavian 
economies. They tend to show that a large openness to world competition can be associated 
to an extended universal welfare provided that the Social System of Innovation (SSI) is 
sufficiently dynamic and the State is responsive to the demands of citizens. It is the 
conjunction of at least four institutions (the welfare system, the form of competition, the 
style of innovation and finally the conception of the state) that is successful in terms of 
economic performance and limitation of inequalities. In isolation none of any single 
component could produce such a result, but each plays a determinant role in conjunction 
with others (figure 8). 
Figure 8 – The small open social democratic economy  
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• The contemporary German configuration is a good example of a triadic complementarity. A 
careful study of the transformation of the structure of governance of German firms (Hopner 
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2001) has exhibited a surprising compatibility between the adoption of shareholder value and 
the persistence of a significant power of wage earners via codetermination laws. How is such 
apparent oxymorum possible?  One answer is precisely that a third institution, the welfare 
state allows the restructuring and employment reduction required by shareholder value by its 
financing of early retirement and unemployment (Boyer 2006b). The initial mismatch 
between two managerial styles has been overcome by a socialization by public budget of the 
externalities thus generated (figure 9).   
Figure 9 – an atypical complementarity  
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These examples point out a specificity of the present analytical framework. Instead of 
analyzing separately the efficiency (and legitimacy) of any single institution, ICH deals with the 
coherence and viability of a whole institutional architecture. Therefore, the association of so-
called “imperfect institutions” may sustain a rather efficient configuration. Given the diversity of 
formal and informal organizations in developing countries, this methodology is quite useful in 
order to detect and explicit actual institutional configurations, faraway from typical text book 
representation of a pure market economy. 
IV.4. The institutional complementarity at the level of growth regimes 
One may analyze the institutional configurations from the point of view of the viability of a 
growth regime and take the rate of growth as one of the criteria for deciding about the 
complementarity of a given set of institutions. This has proven to be useful in order to 
understand the difference among growth regimes within OECD economies.  
 
• For medium or large size economies during the Golden Age, the so called Fordist growth 
was based upon three core institutional arrangements: collective agreements that codified the 
synchronization of productivity and wage increases, a mass production system of 
standardized goods capturing increasing returns to scale and finally a large degree of 
autonomy with respect to foreign competition (figure 10). 
Figure 10 – The golden age Fordist growth regimes 
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• For small open economies, the precise mix of institutions that shape the growth regime is 
quite different from the previous one. The wages are set in the exporting sector in accordance 
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with the preservation of the competitiveness of domestic firms in order to be compatible 
with the requirement of an export led growth. The productive organization is based upon the 
differentiation of products by quality and innovation. These complementarities do shape a 
growth regime that is a priori quite adapted to the new trends of the international economy 
(figure 11).    
Figure 11 –– The Scandinavian social pacts 
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Therefore, the concept of institutional complementarity is quite useful in order to understand 
simultaneously the coherence and the diversity of growth regimes. It is of special interest when 
this methodology is extended to developing countries: given quite different mixes of formal and 
informal institutional arrangements, the related growth regimes may differ from those already 
detected for mature economies.  
IV.5. Some welfare systems may generate virtuous circles…but do not last for 
ever         
It is now possible to deal the issue of welfare: can redistributive measures sustain a dynamic 
growth regime? Retrospective and comparative analyses suggest the possible compatibility or 
even more complementarity between a large welfare State and a dynamic growth regime.     
 
• Within the Fordist growth regime, the intensity and predictability of productivity increases was 
sustaining a very specific capital labor accord that was codifying an institutionalized increase 
of real wage in line with productivity. This was the key component of an original growth 
regime that was satisfying the objective of each collective actor:  high and stable profit for 
entrepreneurs, near full-employment and better standards of living for wage-earners, buoyant 
tax base for State and social welfare financing. Thus, contrary to the teaching of a pure short 
run macroeconomic analysis, an extended system of income redistribution and supply of 
public goods (education, health, security in response to unemployment,…) was exerting a 
positive role upon the stability and the legitimacy of this new institutional architecture 
(figure 12).  
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Figure 12 – An extended welfare: a key component of the Fordist growth regime 
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• The demise of this quite interesting regime brings at the forefront a key finding by régulation 
theory: the very success of this institutional configuration has brought adverse trends that have 
been cumulating and have transformed a virtuous circle into a vicious one. Firstly, the 
productive potential of Fordist methods has been exhausting through time. Secondly, the 
search for increasing returns to scale has triggered an unprecedented internationalization first 
of exchanges and then of production. Thirdly, financial liberalization, both internal and 
external, has eroded the previous institutionalized compromises, especially in terms of tax 
competition among national State. Hence a central conclusion: no institutional configuration, 
however efficient and satisfactory for social actors in the early beginning, can last forever. 
This is an important difference with respect to a branch of the economics of institutions 
based upon an intensive use of the hypothesis of rational expectation and the search for 
steady state growth regime. 
 
• Should one conclude from the previous statement that the epoch of the complementarity 
between an extended welfare and an efficient growth regime is over? Clearly, many OECD 
countries experience recurring financial deficits affecting the various components of their 
Welfare systems, especially concerning healthcare and pensions. But again, the small open 
Scandinavian economies exhibit an interesting counterexample. Of course, the various 
subsystems (unemployment benefit, pensions, health,…) have been rationalized, but the 
creation of new collective rights in response to emerging social needs has generated a new 
virtuous circle between a rejuvenated welfare State and an innovation led growth regime. 
Basically, the effective implementation of full gender equality has triggered an extension of labor 
supply for women, whereas this move has generated new jobs in the service sector in the 
direction of child care, elderly care and health. Coupled with a knowledge based economy, this 
domestic internal economics circuit has proven to be quite satisfactory in terms of response 
to social demand from citizens (figure 13).  
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Figure 13 – Gender equality and responses to ageing as the source of a new service led growth 
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This is an invitation to investigate how the various institutional arrangements put forward by 
figure 1 can be combined in order to take into account the large diversity of contemporary 
Welfare States. 
IV.6. The diversity of welfare configurations  
The central idea is to map the previous “molecules” into the structure of the costs and 
benefits associated with each of the three spheres. Each national system is defined by the share of 
welfare fulfilled within families (domestic order), within large firms (corporatist or paternalistic 
strategy) or across the whole society via State interventions (citizenship as a basis for collective 
solidarity). One gets the following description of social security systems (figure 14). 
 
• Some countries exhibit a clear domination of a leading sphere. Former Soviet Union was a 
good example of a firm based welfare, since a majority of the benefits used to be provided by the 
firm, be they under a monetary payment or by direct provision of health, education leisure. By 
contrast, Sweden and Denmark are emblematic for society wide organized welfare, with 
universalistic values and a financing by general taxation. Southern Europe is a good example 
of the lasting role of family centered solidarity. The idea put forward by New Labor in UK would 
suggest that this is not necessarily an archaism (Giddens 1998) when the solidarity is extended 
from the family to the community and civil society supposed to manufacture trust and 
security (Fukuyama 1996). 
 
• But generally speaking, most systems combine the three sources of solidarity. In Japan for instance, a 
firm based social welfare goes along with an important role of the family, as well as a residual 
role of a minimalist society wide welfare. In France, the ideal of social security, i.e. society 
wide welfare is mitigated by the fact that the financing and in some case the supply of many 
components are provided by the firms. In the US, the provision of welfare is largely attached 
to the labor contract negotiated between the workers and the firms, with some limited 
examples of society wide welfare for specific categories of population. Under this respect, 
most Welfare States are hydrid.  
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Figure 14 – At the origin of Welfare State diversity: three logics and organizing principles 
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IV.7. “Commodification” is not the only future of welfare systems. 
The contemporary issue, widely discussed, about the role that should be attributed to 
privatization and market competition (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; Esping-Andersen 1996; Myles 
and Pierson 2000) is thus largely redefined (figure 15). Basically, each society manifests a strong 
path dependency that is not due to pure historical accidents or circumstances but the very nature 
of social protection (Bonoli and Palier 1999; Palier and Bonoli 2000). The major issue, and the 
French case is quite enlightening under this respect, is the evolution within the triangle (State, 
family, firm). For instance, catching-up countries might need to replace domestic solidarity by 
society wide organization and this is the case for Spain and Portugal. Other societies, such as the 
German and the French ones, might call for a progressive shift from a typical Bismarckian 
system, i.e. largely firm based, toward more Beveridgian, Scandinavian type configuration. 
 
Only few national social security systems display a clear move towards privatization and quasi 
market competition in the supply of welfare. A key reference under with respect is the Chilean 
strong move toward a leading role of private insurance, with a mixed evidence about the gain in 
terms of efficiency and the clear non egalitarian consequences for instance for health care 
provision (WHO, 2000:109). The second example is of course the American privatization of 
pensions, in a sense largely idiosyncratic to the North American Society (Montagne 2000; 
O’Sullivan 2000). But the most intriguing trajectory relates to the Dutch case: the extension of 
universal social rights concerning for example a fully equal treatment of part time and full time 
jobs has been associated with a significant reliance to market mechanisms for the provision of 
welfare (De Beer and Luttikhuizen 1998; Barbier and Theret 2000; Esping-Andersen 2000). 
 
Therefore the choice is not between a purely public welfare and a totally privatized one, but 
governments and social partners are facing the tricky problem of reforming rather idiosyncratic 
configurations, that manifest strong path dependence and combine various logic and regimes for 
welfare provision (figure 16). At least four forces shape the contemporary transformations. 
 
• The privatization strategy is strengthened by the emergence of a finance led regime (Boyer 
2000b) that develop so quickly stock markets that the old pay-as-you-go systems are 
presented as inefficient and even unfair, since workers do not get their share of the increased 
financial wealth (Orléan 2000). But many obstacles prevent the implementation of market 
mechanisms in the other welfare regimes, such as family, unemployment or sickness. Even 
the constitution of quasi markets between independent, generally non profit, institutions 
competing from the supply of welfare benefit is not so easy given the inertia and localization 
of the supply, the difficult of entry, the poor assessment of quality, the large transaction costs 
associated to the management of this competition by regional public bodies. Furthermore, if 
strict rules are not set by public authorities such as block contracts, private firms could cream 
skim the market and let the most severe risks to the public welfare (Le Grand and Bartlett 
1993). Not to forget that the Chilean and American cases show a clear increase in inequality 
in the access to welfare, as a consequence of privatization. 
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Figure 15 – Introducing market mechanisms in Welfare States: A fourth dimension.  
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• A new financialized corporatist welfare is also emerging in the most dynamic industries or regions. 
In a sense it is an updating of the so-called Japanese model. Actually, until the early 90s, the 
Japanese employment system had been perceived as quite efficient and the industrial welfare 
provided by the large firm was conceived as complementing the internal labor market 
(Hanada and Hirano, 2000). This system is now under strain due to the poor macroeconomic 
performance of the Japanese economy and the difficulty for firms to provide the expected 
amount of welfare, especially pensions, given the low profit and the tiny real return of 
financial assets. But the management of some ICT American firms, for instance in the Silicon 
Valley, is in fact updating this model. First, the Japanese profit sharing is replaced by the 
diffusion of stock options and some components of welfare are idiosyncratically adjusted to 
the needs of each employees, in order to prevent  him(her) to move to another company or 
even launch his(her) own start-up. Such an implicit welfare model cannot pretend to be 
universal, since it concerns mainly high level professionals, holders of scarce competence in 
high demand on the international market. 
 
• A community based welfare is too an updating of the family centered welfare typical of some 
contemporary economies, such as the Asian NICs. Actually, even in Europe, the mass 
unemployment hitting specially the young workers and the early retired employees has put 
forward the solidarity organized within the family and this still is a typical pattern for 
Southern Europe. Statistical surveys do show an increase in intergenerational transfers, largely 
a compensating mechanism for deficient society wide welfare. In a sense, the New Labor is 
theorizing this process and trying to extend the solidarity from the domestic circle to the 
community wider scale. It remains to be seen that will be the actual consequences of these 
theoretical conceptions upon the management of the British welfare. In any case, such a 
model cannot pretend to be the dominant one for many reasons. First, the family structure is 
transforming itself toward a two sources of income and gender neutral configuration that calls 
for a redesign of universal welfare as a precondition for its viability (Majnoni d’Intignano 
1999; Esping-Andersen 2000; Théret 2000). Second, the same family or community pattern 
cannot generally prevail in Europe given the diversity of the national trajectories since one 
century. Third, from a theoretical point of view, the internationalization and financialization 
of modern economy propagate new risks that can only be insured at a wider level than the 
family or the community. 
 
• A modernization of universal welfare is far from defining an obsolete model. From a conceptual 
point of view, this is one of the best responses to globalization and it is not an accident if 
small open economies are at the forefront in the redesign of such a welfare model. By the 
way, it has to be remember that Sweden, Finland, Denmark experience a very good record in 
terms of technological advances and the insertion into the ICT revolution, while preserving 
the society wide character of their Welfare State (see figures 3, 8 and 13 supra). If 
institutionally the losers are sure to be compensated by the winners, then the speed of 
technical change can be enhanced, national competitiveness preserved, thus reconciling 
dynamic efficiency with social justice (see figure 2, supra). Contrary to a widely held belief, the 
negotiation by social partners of social pacts that set new rules for wage formation and 
welfare reforms is as efficient or even more than a typical market led strategy (Fitoussi and 
Passet 2000). Under this respect, in the 90s the Dutch model was widely recognized as one 
way quite different from the “Third way” but no less attractive (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
In 2007, the Danish flexicurity model is the implicit or explicit reference of most experts and 
policy makers in the domain of welfare (Boyer 2006a). 
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Figure  16 – Four strategies for reforming the Welfare States: Contrasted national trajectories. 
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This reminds that welfare systems do co-evolve along with national conceptions about social 
justice, political institutions that convert them into specific tax systems and social security regimes, 
and economic specialization. Given the present comparative evidence, it would be an overstatement to 
conclude that there is a single best way for organizing welfare, be it market-led, firm based, community 
centered or Society wide and collectively organized. For developing countries, this widens the 
scope of possible antipoverty policies that have to be tailored to their specific features and 
objectives. 
V.  DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES: SOME 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS   
Are institutional complementarity approaches restricted to industrialized democratic 
countries? This section argues that developing countries should not necessarily mimic the best 
practices of rich economies detected by ICH, but that they may try to detect genuine policies by a 
creative use of the same methodology. Clearly, specific economic specializations dominated by 
primary resources, poor State capabilities, overwhelming role of the informal sector in 
employment relations are among the main distinctive features that call for idiosyncratic approaches, 
tailored for each local or national case.  
V.1. Do not extrapolate successful policies designed for already developed 
countries  
Under this respect, many social sciences might be victim of their ambition and search for 
generality, inspired by the methodological principles of natural sciences. Macroeconomists are 
working hard in order to find out the general structure of a model that would explain quite all 
contemporary issues in economic policy making. Development economists build frequently general 
equilibrium applied models and are tempted to consider that nearly the same key parameters do 
characterize most ,if not all, national economies. Business schools use intensively the detection of 
best practices in order to find out general principles for management, whatever the sector or the 
locality. This aspiration to universal laws, however in conformity with scientific methodology, 
may hide the specificity of social sciences: they have to deal with a large variety of social political and 
economic organizations, far more complex than the configurations studied by physics or chemistry.  
 
Let us take for example the Scandinavian social democratic countries as the reference and 
consider that the main if not exclusive determinant of low poverty rates is the large volume of 
spending for welfare. The policy recommendation in the direction of developing countries would 
be to extend welfare expenditures and eventually try to import the same organization. Some 
countries have followed such a path but they are far from reaping the same benefits in terms of 
poverty reduction and growth performance. The ICH helps in understanding why: a highly 
developed welfare goes along with three related and somehow complementary features 
(figure 17). 
 
• By definition, welfare and employment legislations only apply to formal labor. Since it is highly 
developed in mature economies, the policy has a real impact upon the evolution of total 
employment and wage income. 
 
•  Clearly, the general inclusion of population into the democratic process gives everyone a say in the 
determination of economic and social policy, at least indirectly. One should not 
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underestimate the impact of the access to the electoral process upon the incentives of 
governments to adopt welfare policies directed towards the mass – or the majority – of the 
population. Contemporary Brazil is a good example of the positive impact of democratization 
upon poverty reduction programs adoption (Draibe 2007). 
 
• High value added activities can easily finance not only good wages but also a quite extended 
social insurance coverage. In a sense, the social democratic economies exhibit a 
complementarity between innovation-led growth regime and generous universal welfare State. 
Figure 17 –Developed economies: poverty reduction by large welfare transfers, but the context 
matters 
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These are the hidden or at least frequently neglected components of the general institutional 
architecture that sustains a universal welfare State. Therefore if they are not fulfilled, an isolated 
program of welfare extension will not deliver the same expected outcomes. 
……But take into account the specific context of developing countries  
The Bostwana (Selolwane et al. 2007) and the South Africa (Leftwich 2007) cases incidentally 
deal with this issue. Given the local conditions, the antipoverty programs have had mitigated 
results, largely unintended. The present analytical ICH framework gives an interpretation of this 
process: the programs were not fitted to the local economic social and political configurations 
(figure 18). 
 
• In a society where informal labor is the rule, the strengthening of labor protection and welfare 
of formal employment may exacerbate inequalities between formal and informal workers and 
even induce employers to move away from formal employment contract. The more so, the 
weakest State capacity to enforce regulations. A quite paradoxical and unintended outcome 
indeed…at least for policy makers if not trained economists. 
 
• If the weakest groups of the population are somehow excluded from the political process, 
governments face no incentives to design and implement pro-poor policy, and this might be 
an explanation of the perverse mechanism pointed out by the previous paragraph. Only 
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formal workers are able to influence the formation of political coalitions, whereas informal 
ones don’t. The low mobilization of the poorest is directly related to the scarcity / modesty 
of antipoverty programs. Therefore, changes in the political sphere might be a precondition 
for an effective pro-poor policy. Brazil under President Lula exhibits such a correlation 
(Draibe 2007) 
 
• Some localities, regions or countries are so poor that they cannot provide the minimum 
subsistence level to all the members of the society. In other cases, some surplus exists but it is 
appropriated by a small elite. In both cases, the low productivity of the economy a priori 
precludes the possibility of any redistribution towards the poorest, unless quite drastic and 
coherent structural changes take place in response to a major political, social or financial 
crisis. 
Figure 18 – The poor countries context affects the outcome of the same policy  
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 Consequently, the same policy does not have the same impact in any region of the world. 
This makes quite necessary an adequate diagnosis of the factors limiting productivity, growth, 
employment (see section VI.2, infra). 
V.2. The art of creating virtuous circles by coordinated policies….  
Contrary to the vision popularized by an extreme interpretation of path dependence (Crouch 
1999; Streeck and Thelen 2005), such vicious circles, whereby underdevelopment and mass 
poverty reinforce each other, can be broken down in special circumstances when for instance a 
acute social, economic and political crisis make impossible the reproduction of the past, especially 
if the international relations change and a new productive paradigm emerges (see figure 5 supra). 
Actually, the Irish case (Kirby 2007) is a good example of such a change in a long term trajectory 
along which poverty was perceived as a fatality. Virtuous circles, if not miracles, can be created by 
collective action (figure 19).  
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Figure 19 – The creating virtuous circles: searching for complementarity institutional reforms and 
policies (Ireland) 
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The success, observed ex post, seems to proceed from the synchronization of complementary 
policies. All of them aim at shifting economic specialization towards high added value activities:  
 
• In order to attract high tech multinationals, the taxation of profit should be kept low by 
comparison of alternative location in Europe. The subsidies generated by the adhesion of 
Ireland to Europe have also played a role in the building of modern infrastructures, as a 
source of competitiveness.   
 
• National agreements between entrepreneurs association, unions and State look for the 
competitiveness of the Irish territory via a complex mix of wage moderation, skill formation 
various incentives in the direction of an industrial policy and innovation.    
 
• A rather lean Welfare State built upon minimal levels of universal entitlements to income along 
with market supplied services.  
 
One does not observe a big push in welfare but the dynamism of growth, employment 
creation and productivity increases finally trickle down and eradicate a large fraction of poverty, 
without any clear redistribution of income from the rich to the poor. Even if the disadvantaged 
are treated as a residual category (Hardman 1998, quoted by Kirby 2007), a virtuous circle has 
taken place in Ireland, largely based upon complementary policies, without a leading role for 
welfare policy. 
….but they do not last for ever! 
This is of course a limit of the “Celtic tiger” model: poverty reduction does not mean a 
stabilization of inequalities. But it is not the only one, since the maturation of this new growth 
regime generates a series of structural transformations and emerging disequilibria (figure 20). 
 
• The shift of employment creation from the manufacturing sector to the financial sector and 
the construction may destabilize the previous source of competitiveness and the very engine of 
Irish growth. 
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• These structural changes also bring a widening of income and wealth distribution and in such 
a context, the minimalist welfare State could be perceived as insufficient and this could trigger a 
de-legitimization of current policies. 
 
• Finally, the international context may turn less favorable, the net transfers from the European 
budget level off and new EU members may outperform Ireland by using the same strategy 
but more efficiently. This is a major risk to the Irish strategy of reduction of poverty, 
essentially economic led.   
Figure 20 – The tensions in the Irish configuration 
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V.3. The crucial role of political alliances… 
 The previous analyses might suggest that the selection and implementation of a “good 
policy”- i.e. Pareto improving- is essentially an exercise in applied economy. If politicians do not 
buy their pet program, the economists generally blame the irrationality of the groups that have 
blocked it or the lack economic expertise of decision makers. This feeling originates from a 
drastic underestimation of politics, defined as “all the activities of cooperation, conflict and 
negotiation involved in decisions about the use, distribution and distribution of resources” 
(Leftwich 2007:3). Therefore, the inner intricacies of the political process are crucial since any 
institutional reform of   requires the formation and durability of a socio-political coalition in 
democratic regimes (figure 21). Of course, such a coalition is easier if the reform sets into motion 
a positive and increasing sum game, at odds with policies that would organize a mere 
redistribution from the rich to the poor at the cost of a possible negative impact upon economic 
activity. 
  
The task of the social scientist is then to “identify, support and encourage the political forces 
and coalitions which alone will create and sustain the institutional arrangements of development 
states  dedicated to both growth and poverty reduction” (Leftwich 2007 :1).  
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Figure 21 – The interplay of political and economic determinants of institutional reforms 
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Figure 22– The creating virtuous circles: searching for complementarity institutional reforms and 
policies (Finland 1960-1980…) 
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• An equivalent feedback from political compromises to economic growth took place in 
Botswana but the political alliances were quite different indeed between cattle owners and 
government (Selolwane et al. 2007). The emerging complementarity between accelerated growth 
and an improvement in social indicators originated from a positive shock, i.e. the discovery of 
new and highly valuable natural resources. But similarly to the Finnish case, a prudent initial 
move concerning welfare was progressively extended, thus generating a cumulative 
transformation of the society and the economy (figure 23).  
Figure 23– Botswana exhibits a totally different virtuous circle 
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Clearly, various configurations may exhibit a complementarity or at least a compatibility, between 
different institutional arrangements that themselves derive from quite specific political compromises.  
V.4. An aggiornamento in development strategies  
Finally, the present use of ICH to renew some development theory brings an interesting 
perspective. Development economics has become systemic and institutionalist, given that they have 
benefited from the lessons learnt from history and from theoretical advances; and also because 
they are now imbued with their own conceptual foundations.  
 
Comparative development analysis and modern economic theory actually constitute useful 
antidotes against those dogmatic visions and ideologies that attempt to pit interventionist 
conceptions against the neo-liberal vision. The end result is that no pure and unadulterated strategy, 
i.e. one which is based either on “100% State” or on “100% market”, has been successful – and 
theory has confirmed the innate limitations of any economic regime that is based on only one of 
these two mechanisms of co-ordination. A first solution thus consists of offsetting market failures by 
the appropriate State interventions and, vice versa, transcending the State’s limitations thanks to 
processes that mimic market competition wherever possible. 
 
The crises that were observed throughout the 1990s reinforce this diagnostic. Whereas in the 
1980s certain instances of under-development could be attributed to excessive interventionism, the 
financial crisis of 1997-1998 showed that the extension of the market to the financial sphere (and to 
derivative financial products) could also lead to a de-stabilization of even the most dynamic 
modes of development (e.g. South-East Asia). Too much market can be harmful to development. 
The 1998 disintegration of the “Washington consensus”, which had previously dominated 
international organization’s conceptions of development, attests to this awareness. Political 
leaders and experts have been looking for a new doctrine (in the noblest sense of the term). Most 
have recognized the need for a new institutional architecture or at least for new rules for running 
the international financial system. 
 
This is the second path that we would like to open up in our attempt to solve the State/market 
dilemma (figure 24). On one hand, we now know that successful development depends on the 
complementarity between these two logics, and not on the affirmation of one or the other.  
Remember that the market is a social construction whose emergence and viability are predicated 
on a rich set of legal rules, codes and supervisory bodies. In addition, modern institutionalist 
research has stressed that the institutional arrangements serving as intermediaries between the State and 
the market (i.e. associations, communities, partnerships, etc.) can play a crucial role in reconciling 
the imperatives of dynamic efficiency (such as higher productivity or living standards) and social 
justice, construed here as an overly un egalitarian distribution of the fruits of growth. 
 
It is therefore illusory to blame one single factor for the hindrance of development. An 
approach that is based on interdependency, externality and complementarity is far superior. The 
systemic and changing nature of development has to be acknowledged. 
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Figure 24 – From the Washington consensus to an institutionalist and systemic approach to 
development 
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On this theoretical background, what are the methods and analytical tools in order to 
implement pro-growth and antipoverty strategies? 
VI.  SOME METHODS IN ORDER TO APPLY THE INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEMENTARITY HYPOTHESIS 
This section proposes some perspectives concerning the extension of the previous framework 
to the issue of poverty reduction outside the industrialized world  
VI.1. A first method for detecting successful configurations  
In order to counterbalance the tyranny of the deductive method that looks for a first best 
solution or a one best way, it might be interesting to approach inductively the issue of poverty 
reduction. Firstly, what are the countries that in the contemporary period or back to some 
previous episodes have been successful in significantly reducing poverty? Secondly, what are the 
factors possibly explaining these successes:  the intensity, stability and nature of the growth 
regime (inward or outward looking, natural resources or innovation led); the volume and 
composition of welfare expenditures (education, health, income security, quality of public 
services); the degree and nature of regulation of labor markets (minimum wage, type of labor 
contracts, coverage of collective bargaining); the style of policy regimes (degree of centralization, 
nature of democracy, process of intermediation of conflicting interests). The first step is then to 
use Qualitative Comparative Analysis in order to detect the various configurations of the 
previous variables that are empirically associated to poverty reduction. This is the method that 
allowed the detection of the three configurations of the new economy exhibited by figures 3, 4, 
and 5. An alternative method would be to mix all the variables and use a cluster analysis to look 
for what is the grouping of successful countries that emerges. 
 
This method could be useful to test the relevance and generality of the taxonomy of policy 
regimes of poverty eradication proposed by the project proposal elaborated by UNRISD (2005) 
in its Appendix 1 (legacy of the socialist model, Asian authoritarian development State, the 
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democratic development State of Nordic countries,  structural adjustment, good governance and 
pro-poor policy). Finally, a panel data analysis could mix cross section and time series in order to 
test more precisely the quantitative contribution of the variables typical of each regime.  
      
VI.2. A second method: combining two diagnoses about the origin of 
poverty and the inhibiting factors of growth 
 
By contrast, this second approach aims at capturing the features that are specific to a given 
country at a precise period in time. The issue is to detect what should be the most convenient 
policy mix compatible with a dual objective of growth promotion as source of productive 
employment and poverty eradication. The answer cannot be derived from pure theory since the 
precise structural conditions have to be analyzed in each national, regional or local context. In a 
sense, this is a drastic reversal with respect to the legacy of the so-called Washington consensus, 
according which the same general menu was supposed to fit all the domestic contexts. 
 
Have we the relevant tools in order to make such an analysis? The long experience of 
development economics has recently delivered a quite interesting and stimulating method in 
order to cope with the diversity of developing as well as developed countries. The growth diagnostics 
(Hausmann et al. 2005) proposes to systematically review what are the multipliers associated to 
the relaxation of the various constraints inhibiting economic activity and to design accordingly 
economic policy and reform economic institutions. In some instance, a policy that delivers quite 
impressive result in one country may be inefficient, or worse detrimental, to growth in another 
and conversely. Actually, static efficiency – frequently associated to price flexibility – has to be 
distinguished from dynamic efficiency, i.e. the ability to improve cumulatively productivity and 
standards of living of an entire population. This dilemma has already been addressed to in section 
II.3 and figure 2). 
 
 It might be useful to rejuvenate a macroeconomic theory that has been quite enlightening in 
the 80s in order to propose an analytical framework that would transcend the opposition between 
Keynesian and neoclassical conception of the determinants of employment (Benassy 1982). 
Actually the so-called disequilibrium theory exhibits a series of determinants of employment. The 
unemployment is Keynesian if the limiting factor is effective demand, classical if the low 
profitability limits hiring, Marxian if the scarcity of productive capacity is at the origin of low 
employment. When applied to developing countries and to the analysis of growth and 
employment, this framework delivers three major teaching (figure 25). 
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Figure 25 – A diagnostics approach to growth stimulation 
 
            
     
     
     
      
          
  
WHAT ARE THE FACTORS LIMITING GROWTH? 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of demand 
  
Excessive costs 
 
  Lack of productive capacity 
  
 
  
 
 
Over- 
evaluation 
of the 
currency 
 
Bad policy 
mix 
Low income  Low 
productivity 
High wage Low rate
of return 
of capital 
Uncertainty High real
interest 
rate 
  
 
 
Change in 
monetary 
policy 
Adjustment 
of public 
policy 
Higher 
minimum 
wage; 
unemployment 
benefit 
Better 
private 
management 
Too low a 
wage. Need 
for income 
security 
Lack of skills, 
education/training 
Need for 
flexibility, 
i.e., wage 
reduction 
More
innovation 
Less 
taxation 
Reform of 
the 
financial 
system 
Monetary 
policy 
 
 38
 
• In many cases, the issue of labor market institutions and welfare reforms might be irrelevant, since 
the disequilibrium originates from totally different factors: an overvaluation of the domestic 
currency, an excessively high interest rate due to the lack of credibility of economic policy or 
a bad management of firms…In such a context, the search for wage flexibility for example 
may deliver second order results, since this is not the relevant constraints of growth. Too 
often, in the 90s, financial disequilibria have triggered excessive down grading of workers 
security in terms of wage, work intensity, welfare… 
 
• In some instances, growth and employment can increase by strengthening a precise form of 
workers rights. For instance, if unemployment is Keynesian, more income security for workers 
has a positive impact both on employment and profit rate. Similarly, when firms are limited 
by skill scarcity, a policy developing workers competences simultaneously improves 
macroeconomic performance and promotes welfare as well as a possible reduction of income 
inequality. In this case, there is a complementarity between employment level and a form of 
antipoverty policies. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the case, and the precise social policy 
mix has to be tuned to the precise local situation at a given historical period. 
 
• Within a third configuration, labor flexibility might be required in order to increase productive 
employment if for instance classical unemployment is the main source of macroeconomic 
disequilibria. Alternatively, some collective agreements can codify automatic indexation to 
inflation and productivity, and this configuration that might appear unable to react effectively 
to new macroeconomic shocks. This case was quite frequent in the 70s and 80s (see figure 
12) but that nowadays the majority of developing countries are suffering from the opposite 
disequilibrium: productivity increases mainly feed profit increase and relative prices decline 
but only marginally wage increase. The likelihood of this third configuration is now quite 
small in most developing countries. 
 
The compatibility between pro-growth policies and antipoverty strategies can be addressed 
applying the same method of growth diagnosis to the analysis of the factors that explain poverty 
(figure 26). After a second diagnosis of the most efficient instruments against poverty, one can 
look for measures that simultaneously belong to the two diagnoses. The originality is to look for 
the policies that simultaneously reduce poverty and enhance growth. The previous general 
discussion and various examples suggest that such a policy set is not empty, but probably 
depends a lot from the local context. Actually, a pro-growth and antipoverty policy takes place 
within totally different institutional settings, since productive structures, social values and political 
choices significantly differ from one country to another. Furthermore, even within the same 
national economy, one could observe the coexistence of defensive flexibility – i.e. via wage 
reduction and work intensity increase – in some clusters along with offensive flexibility in others 
where the building of individual and collective competence is the main answer to technical 
change and evolution of world competition (Vijayabaskar 2005). 
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Figure 26 – A  diagnostics approach to poverty reduction  
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But the task of the expert does not end with the detection of possible and more satisfactory 
growth regimes. 
VI.3. How to go from here to there? 
A rigorous economic analysis may well detect the key factors at the origin of poverty and 
propose relevant policies. Will national governments adopt these policies and international 
organizations co-finance some of the programs derived from these policies? A political economic 
approach is then required. Efficient policies might be rejected by lack of legitimacy and 
conversely political legitimacy and social acceptability do not imply any economic rationality 
(figure 27). 
Figure 27 – The duality between political legitimacy and economic efficiency 
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 The timing of the costs and benefits of any economic reform plays a major role in its 
acceptability and legitimacy (figure 28). 
 
• If this is a win/win strategy for all the actors and for any subsequent period and it should be 
easy for the government to convince them to support the program. But this case is rather rare 
indeed (trajectory 1) 
 
• Initially, some individuals and groups may win but others may loose in the context of a positive 
gain of welfare at the economy wide level. Only in the long run do all the groups and 
individuals gain from the reform. Finally, the faster the growth, the larger the dividends of 
growth that can be redistributed, including to poor people, but explicit redistributive 
arrangements have to be built (trajectory 2). But in the transition period, the nature of the 
political process become crucial, the better dynamic efficiency can be blocked by the short 
termism implicit to electoral cycles or by the absence of legitimacy of a pro-poor policy.  
 
• The political leadership is still more needed when the reform initially reduces national income if 
for instance a higher taxation of high incomes or profit initially triggers a flight of capital out 
of the country before the recovery of domestic investment (trajectory 3). 
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Figure 28 – The time profile of costs and benefits of an institutional reform 
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Thus policy regimes are crucial in the implementation of any pro-poor policies and this confirms 
one of the basic hypotheses of the UNRISD program. 
VII.  CONCLUSION: ORGANIZING THE SPILL-OVERS BETWEEN 
CASE STUDIES AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY 
THEORIZING 
The guiding principle of the present chapter is quite simple. How could Institutional 
Complementarity Theory enlighten one of the crucial contemporary issues in development, i.e. 
the design and implementation pro-growth and anti-poverty strategies? The present analyses 
converge towards the following provisional teachings. 
 
1. The failure of mono-causal explanations of under-development and the limited efficacy of 
the benchmarking of anti poverty programs and the adoption by other countries of best 
practices call for a systemic and institutional approach to development. The motto could 
be “Getting the institutions right” not in the abstract,   but taking  fully into account 
the national legacy in terms of productive organization, basic social values and style of the 
political regime. 
 
2. The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis is part of this research agenda since it helps in 
assessing the viability and performance of a complete set of economic institutions. 
When poverty is a mass phenomenon, informal labor is the rule and economic 
performance poor, any anti-poverty has to be part of mix of policies that affect the very 
nature of the growth regime. Thus economic and social policies have to be at least 
compatible and ideally complementary. 
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3. Whatever the variety of national institutional embeddedness of these policies, they all 
share a common general principle: they aim at creating not miracles but virtuous circles 
via the promotion and coupling of higher value added products and processes with a 
legitimized distribution and redistribution of income towards the less privileged groups 
of the society. No ambitious social policy can be successful in a society with no 
productive surplus. 
 
4. This theorizing inspired by ICH opens the possibility of various virtuous configurations for 
pro-growth and anti-poverty strategies and preliminary comparative international 
analyses confirm their diversity in response to local conditions and circumstances, such as the 
nature of the insertion into the world economy, past economic specialization, emerging 
new opportunities, the ability to build social and political compromises and to 
renegotiate them when required by major structural changes. 
 
5. The Qualitative Comparative Analysis can be used to detect in contemporary world, but 
also back in history, the various implementations of successful anti-poverty growth regimes. It 
is still more important to mobilize this inductive method in order to explicit the various 
factors that may trigger the transition from a stagnant and poor society to a dynamic and 
rich economy. The complete case studies undertaken for the UNRISD program on 
“Poverty Reduction and Policy regimes” could be the starting point for a more 
systematic search for the characteristics of political processes that are determinant in the 
emergence of pro-poor coalitions.  
 
6. The extension of Growth diagnoses to the search of poverty determinants opens another 
research agenda. Some case studies already show that adequate policies and institutional 
reforms can enter into synergy and deliver simultaneously an acceleration of growth and 
a structural reduction of poverty. In some instances, the breaking down of built-in 
inertia is up to a radical change in the political sphere, such as the end of a form of apartheid, 
or a transition to democracy. 
 
7. This is an invitation to overcome a typical technocratic illusion that considers that the best 
practices, since they are Pareto improving, are self implementing. Quite on the 
contrary, it is crucial to detect, identify and support the groups and political coalitions 
which are able to design, implement and sustain the institutions and policies of a 
development state over a period of time sufficiently long for reaping the benefits of 
growth and poverty reduction.     
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